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Resistance to medical artificial intelligence is an attribute in a
compensatory decision process: response to Pezzo and Becksted
(2020)
Chiara Longoni∗ Andrea Bonezzi† Carey K. Morewedge‡
Abstract
In Longoni et al. (2019), we examine how algorithm aversion influences utilization of healthcare delivered by human and
artificial intelligence providers. Pezzo and Becksted’s (2020) commentary asks whether resistance to medical AI takes the
form of a noncompensatory decision strategy, in which a single attribute determines provider choice, or whether resistance to
medical AI is one of several attributes considered in a compensatory decision strategy. We clarify that our paper both claims
and finds that, all else equal, resistance to medical AI is one of several attributes (e.g., cost and performance) influencing
healthcare utilization decisions. In other words, resistance to medical AI is a consequential input to compensatory decisions
regarding healthcare utilization and provider choice decisions, not a noncompensatory decision strategy. People do not always
reject healthcare provided by AI, and our article makes no claim that they do.
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1 Introduction
Preferences for clinical relative to statistical judgments have
been an important focus of research in judgment and deci-
sion making, from Paul Meehl’s seminal contribution to the
present day (Meehl, 1954). This research shows that peo-
ple generally prefer to rely on human rather than statistical
judgment (e.g., actuarial rules; Dawes et al., 1989). Algo-
rithm aversion is a timely and consequential example of this
preference, whether characterized as a preference for human
judgment relative to similar algorithmic judgment, or as a
more general distrust of algorithmic judgment (Dietvorst et
al., 2015; cf., Castelo et al., 2019; Logg et al., 2019). In this
vein, we recently published an article examining how algo-
rithm aversion influences utilization of healthcare delivered
by human and artificial intelligence providers (Longoni et
al., 2019).
Pezzo and Becksted’s (2020) commentary on our article
raises the question of whether, in the medical context, algo-
rithm aversion takes the form of a noncompensatory deci-
sion strategy determined by a single attribute (i.e., provider
type), or if algorithm aversion is one of several attributes
considered in a compensatory decision of which healthcare
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provider to utilize (Elrod et al., 2004). In other words, do
people always prefer human providers to AI providers, no
matter the circumstances? Or do they exhibit a relative pref-
erence for healthcare delivered by human providers than by
AI providers, which can be outweighed by other attributes,
such as the price and performance of each provider? For-
tunately, our article provides a clear answer (Longoni et al.,
2019).
We hypothesized that, all else equal, people prefer to re-
ceive healthcare from a human provider than from an AI
provider. In other words, whether a provider is an algo-
rithm or human is one of several attributes that influence
compensatory healthcare utilization decisions – whether to
utilize healthcare delivered by a particular provider, or which
healthcare provider to utilize. The studies we report tested
our theory across a variety of forms of healthcare (preven-
tion, diagnoses, treatments), medical conditions (e.g., stress,
skin cancer, emergency triage, coronary by-pass surgery),
and preference elicitation measures (utilization decisions,
pairwise choice, relative preferences, adherence, and will-
ingness to pay). We found that participants were on the
average less likely to utilize healthcare delivered by an AI
provider than a comparable human provider (Study 1). Par-
ticipants were willing to pay more to switch from an AI
provider to a comparable human provider than vice versa
(Study 2). Participants were less sensitive to provider per-
formance information when indicating their relative prefer-
ence between an AI and human provider, than when indicat-
ing their preference between two human providers (Studies
3A–3C). In a conjoint analysis, where respondents faced
a trade-off among healthcare provider type (human versus
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AI), performance, and price, we found negative perceived
utility associated with an AI provider relative to a human
provider (Study 4). These findings clearly show that, all else
equal, participants were less likely to utilize the same health-
care delivered by an AI provider than by a human provider.
These results suggest that, in the medical context, algorithm
aversion is one of many important attributes that influence
healthcare utilization and provider choice.
It is important to note that, based on a reading of our dis-
cussion of studies 3A and 3C, Pezzo and Beckstead (2020)
mischaracterized our predictions and conclusions. We did
not claim that, “people always prefer a human to an artifi-
cially intelligent (AI) medical provider.” While we see how it
is possible to have extracted that interpretation from the ver-
batim text of a few sentences of our paper, their interpretation
is inaccurate and obviously wrong.
Their commentary further remarks that our results show
that “People actually did prefer the AI provider so long as
it outperformed the human provider.” This remark made us
realize that what seemed obvious to us, might not have been
obvious to readers. Pezzo and Becksted (2020) implicitly
assume that resistance to medical AI implies a noncompen-
satory decision rule that ought to be assessed with respect to
an absolute reference point (e.g., the point of indifference on
the scale we used in studies 3A-3C). We made a conscious
effort to communicate our stance on the compensatory nature
of this decision process as clearly as possible, and often, in
our manuscript. In the abstract, we state that “(consumers)
are less sensitive to differences in provider (AI as compared
to human) performance.” In the General Discussion, we re-
mark that “in studies 3A–3C, participants exhibited weaker
preference for a provider that offered clearly superior perfor-
mance when such provider was automated rather than hu-
man” (p. 645). In the General Discussion, we further remark
that, “The choice-based conjoint in study 4 showed a nega-
tive partworth utility for an automated provider, suggesting
that, when we control for accuracy and cost, participants
preferred a human to an automated provider” (p. 645; all
italics added). Overall, these studies illustrate that all else
equal, consumers are reluctant to utilize healthcare provided
by AI rather than human providers, but that other factors,
such as price and performance also significantly contribute
to provider choice.
We did not emphasize these obvious points, but a casual
reader should note that the results of several of our “effect”
studies (1–4) explicitly demonstrate that other factors also
contribute to choice of provider – that provider choice was
compensatory. In study 2, the focal dependent variable is
the amount of money at which participants were indiffer-
ent between a human and an AI provider. Thus, price and
provider choice were compensatory. In study 4, compen-
satory decisions were also evident, as the partworth utilities
of price, performance, and provider (human or AI) were all
significant. Moreover, tests of our process account demon-
Figure 1: Sample conjoint choice task in study 4 (repro-
duced from Longoni et al., 2019).
Table 1: Utilities from choice-based conjoint task in study 4
(reproduced from Longoni et al., 2019).
Attribute Level Avg. Utilities S.D.
Provider Human, Robotic −29.78 52.23
Accuracy 81%, 84%, 87% 26.54 10.94
Cost $20, $40, $60 −2.24 1.69
strated several moderators, cases in which participants ex-
hibited no reluctance to utilize healthcare delivered by an AI
provider relative to healthcare delivered by a comparable hu-
man provider. Participants were happy to utilize AI providers
that were personalized to their conditions in study 7, were
happy to utilize AI providers if there was human oversight of
their decisions in study 9, and we illustrated how individual
differences moderated preferences for healthcare providers
in study 5.
An important question for future work to investigate
is whether, and under what circumstances AI healthcare
providers are preferred to human healthcare providers. As
we explicitly discuss in our paper (Longoni et al., 2019, p.
647), we believe that many people may prefer algorithmic to
human judgment if they are being tested or treated for stigma-
tized health conditions (e.g., sexually transmitted diseases).
Another circumstance where algorithms might be preferred
is when interacting with the provider might endanger his or
her life (e.g., triage services for COVID-19).
We wish to correct a second inaccurate claim made by
Pezzo and Beckstead (2020), that “the effects of accuracy
could not be tested in seven of their ten studies, either because
participants received incomplete accuracy information that
did not allow for a direct comparison between human and
computer (studies 1 and 4).” Yet, performance statistics for
human and AI providers were presented in exactly the same,
complete format to all participant across all studies, whether
within or between subjects. Study 4 employed a conjoint-
based exercise, in which participants made several choices
among three providers that explicitly varied in price, perfor-
mance, and type (i.e., AI versus human; see Figure 1). The
output of the choice-based conjoint provides a partworth util-
ity measure for each of those attributes, which describes the
relative impact of each attribute when they are considered
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together (Table 1). These values suggest that provider type
was the most important attribute, but that accuracy was a
close second, and price was a relatively distant third. These
relative ratings demonstrate unambiguously that if perfor-
mance gaps are sufficiently great, then people may prefer
an AI to a human provider. Studies 3A–3C, which Pezzo
and Beckstead highlight in their commentary, employed a
joint evaluation paradigm, specifically to observe compara-
tive preferences when accuracy was easily comparable and
easily evaluable. Manipulation checks confirmed that par-
ticipants encoded and recalled this information correctly.
Our findings provide a clear answer to the question Pezzo
and Becksted (2020) allude to in their commentary. Algo-
rithm aversion is one of several attributes that can be in-
cluded in a compensatory decision process that determines
healthcare utilization and choice of healthcare providers. Put
simply, resistance to medical AI is an important factor in a
compensatory decision strategy, not a noncompensatory de-
cision rule. Clearly, people do not always reject healthcare
provided by AI, and our article never claimed that they do.
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